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THE CHANGING CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT INTO JAPAN
Japan’s prolonged recession over the last five years has provided the impetus for
regulatory reform and industry restructuring. Historically, the flow of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) into Japan has been small for an economy of its size. The high degree of
vertical integration and relatively closed business networks that characterised the
corporate system made it hard for newcomers to gain access, while the tradition of lifetime
employment limited the ability of foreign firms to recruit quality staff. Dramatic declines
in the price of Japanese equities and land since the collapse of the bubble economy of the
early nineties has been accompanied by a sharp increase in foreign participation in the
Japanese economy. Traditional business relationships are opening up, regulations are
being dismantled or revised and increased foreign involvement is now accepted as
inevitable, even through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Potentially profitable openings
created by restructuring and reform is likely to see the trend towards greater foreign
investment in Japan maintained over the next decade, especially in non-manufacturing.
Introduction
The last five years have been a time of rapid change in Japan. As a result, foreign investment
in Japan is not the same proposition as it was a few years ago and it is important for firms to
reassess the prospects for establishing a presence there.
FDI into Japan is on the rise
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)1  into Japan has recently shown impressive growth, in
particular in relation to non-manufacturing sectors like financial services. While there has
been rapid growth in FDI worldwide for a number of years, FDI into Japan has been relatively
low because of a number of features of the Japanese business environment. However, the value
of foreign inflows in 1998 was much higher than in 1997, despite (and in part because of) the
economy’s slide into recession, and the growth of inflows accelerated through 1998 and in the
first half of 1999.
Growing FDI opportunities in Japan stem from the interaction of a number of recent
developments. The prolonged stagnation in the Japanese economy has encouraged regulatory
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reform, and tough times and falling prices are prompting massive industry restructuring
regardless of government action. The sale of non-performing Japanese business assets is
putting greater amounts of domestic capital on the market than previously, and the twin
pincers of deregulation and recession are eroding traditional business relationships and
prompting a greater acceptance of the need for greater foreign involvement.
In addition to these general developments, the Japanese government is taking more
aggressive action to promote FDI into Japan, for example via tax and credit incentives. There
is a greater realisation among policymakers than before the bursting of the bubble that inward
FDI offers benefits to Japan in accelerating structural reform and internationalising the
Japanese economy.
Despite changing market conditions, there are still important difficulties in undertaking
FDI into Japan, especially in respect of mergers and acquisitions. These difficulties include
those associated with established business practices, high business costs and recruitment, as
well as regulatory impediments, which remain high in some sectors.
A number of important opportunities are arising in sectors of the Japanese economy
where Australian firms are strong performers. Strategies need to be developed to take timely
advantage of these emerging opportunities. The current circumstances offer a window of
opportunity but companies may need to spend time and effort to understand and establish
themselves in the Japanese market before undertaking substantial investments. As a conse-
quence, firms need to be considering potential opportunities now if they are to position
themselves ahead of competitors.
Lack of familiarity with the changing situation in Japan may be a large obstacle to a
timely ability to seize profitable opportunities, as may negative assessments of the prospects
for investment in Japan arising from perceptions that are now out of date. Government bodies
are able to assist in overcoming some of these difficulties, in particular a lack of information
on developments in the Japanese market.
Trends in foreign direct investment in Japan
Recent trends in historical perspective
One of the key developments in world FDI trends was the emergence of Japan as a major
outward investor in the late 1980s. In the late 1990s, Japan’s importance as a recipient country
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for foreign investment inflows is growing. Japanese FDI inflows have risen sharply, particu-
larly in the last three years and recorded an all-time high in 1998.
According to notifications made to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, the total value of FDI
inflows into Japan in 1998 totaled JPY 1.34 trillion (A$17.8 billion) (see Figure 1). The value
of inward investments in 1998 was well above the recent trend growth. Average annual inflows
between 1996 and 1998 were over 200 per cent higher than between 1990 and 1995. Almost all
of the increase in FDI into Japan in the last three years has been in the non-manufacturing
sector, while FDI into manufacturing has been relatively stable.
The first boom in FDI inflows that occurred at the height of the bubble period in the late
1980s and early 1990s was largely the product of Japan’s own domestic economic boom. When
the bubble burst, FDI fell back again. What is remarkable about the second boom that is now
occurring is that FDI inflows are rising despite prolonged Japanese economic stagnation. This
suggests that more fundamental changes lie behind the recent rise in FDI.
Although the total value of FDI inflows has increased significantly, the total number of
inward investment projects has increased more gradually. In 1998,  1,542 cases were recorded,
which represents a small increase in the number of investments on 1996 and 1997 (Appendix
Figure 1).
This implies that the average size of investments is rising. Value per case of FDI has
increased rapidly since 1996 and reached JPY 870 million (A$11.5 million) in 1998 (Figure 2).
Recent increases in FDI into Japan have come off a very low base. Although Japan now
plays quite a large role as an outward investor, FDI inflows into Japan have historically been
very low for an economy of its size. This was partly a reflection of government policy. Until the
late 1960s foreign investment in Japan was very limited and approved only on a case-by-case
basis. The government’s main objective during that period was to improve the technology and
management expertise of Japanese firms by selecting the technologies to be imported.
However, since 1976, and particularly since the passage of the ‘Liberalisation Act’ in 1980, the
majority of direct prohibitions on investment have been removed (OECD 1994).
Despite these changes, inward investment has remained low by international standards.
In 1997, while Japanese FDI outflows constituted 6% of total world FDI outflows, FDI inflows
into Japan were less than 1% of world FDI inflows, despite the fact that Japan represents
around 7.5% of world GDP (Figures 3 and 4). Over the last 20 years, Japanese FDI inflows as
a proportion of GDP have been 20 to 30 times less than the OECD average. Japanese FDI
inflows were only a little over 0.1% of GDP in 1997 and although that proportion more than
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Figure 2  Japanese FDI inflows (value per case)
Figure 1 Total value of Japanese FDI inflows
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Figure 3  World FDI outflows by region (values)
Figure 4  World FDI inflows by region (values)
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, November 1998, New York.
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, November 1998, New York.
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doubled in 1998 to almost 0.3% of GDP (Figure 5), it remains low in comparison to other
developed countries, where inward foreign investment of between 2–3% of GDP is not
uncommon (Figure 6). The potential growth of FDI into Japan therefore remains extremely
high.
Trends in the form of FDI
Until the early 1990s, FDI flowed primarily to manufacturing industries. Since then, the trend
has changed, with a marked increase in foreign investment in non-manufacturing industries
(Figure 6). The share of FDI flowing to the finance and insurance sectors has increased
particularly sharply in recent years, with those sectors accounting for 45% of all FDI in 1998.
The extraordinary activity in these sectors is largely a reflection of the shake-up in the financial
sector, considered in the next section. In 1998, the amount of foreign investment in the finance
sector was nearly three times higher than the figure for 1997, which was itself a record .
The World Investment Report 1998 classifies FDI in terms of mergers, acquisitions,
greenfield investments, real estate purchases and joint ventures. Unfortunately, Japan does
not explicitly categorise investment proposals along these lines. However, they can be
classified on the basis of the descriptions provided to authorities. From this classification, it
can be determined that M&A activity, particularly mergers or acquisitions involving a majority
foreign stake, have not in the past been common in Japan. Majority M&A is the dominant form
of FDI elsewhere because it offers a range of advantages in terms of the scale and the speed with
which new investments can be up and running. Majority M&A accounted for 70% or more of
net FDI inflows into the US, Germany, Canada and France but only 26% in Japan (see Table
1) and, at 0.006%, cross-border M&A represented a far smaller proportion of GDP in Japan
than in any other of the major OECD economies.
The low level of M&A activity has been ascribed in part to the strongly negative
perception of corporate sales and to various impediments to acquisition, such as cross-
shareholdings among companies and the difficulty of obtaining necessary corporate informa-
tion (MITI 1998).
Despite these traditional obstacles, Japan is currently going through a second boom in
M&A (Figure 8). Although some of this boom reflects a marked expansion in M&A activity
between domestic companies (marked as IN-IN on Figure 9), M&As between foreign and
domestic firms (marked as OUT-IN on Figure 9) have also been increasing gradually since the
mid-nineties. The factors contributing to the recent expansion of M&A, including the dramatic
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Figure 5 Japanese FDI inflows as a share of nominal GDP
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Table 1 Cross-border M&A in OECD countries
                              M&A inflows/GDP %                            Inflows(M&A/FDI)
All M&A Majority All M&A Majority
Japan 0.006 0.002 2.120 0.472
USA 0.086 0.074 0.881 0.753
Canada 0.188 0.154 1.318 1.081
France 0.087 0.064 0.605 0.445
UK 0.328 0.298 1.393 1.265
Germany 0.048 0.045 3.041 2.852
Italy 0.052 0.029 1.513 0.836
Spain 0.061 0.026 0.549 0.236
Australia 0.323 0.223 1.233 0.852
Note: Majority: transactions in which the foreign investor acquires more than 50% ownership.
(1995–97 average).
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998, November 1998, New York; IMF, International
Financial Statistics, May 1999, Washington DC.
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process of corporate restructuring induced by the prolonged recession and the reorganisation
of sectors where deregulation has been carried out, will be examined in detail below.
Figure 9 documents the number of M&A cases in the various categories. It is reasonable
to think that this profile may understate the significance of the increase in foreign M&A
activity over the last three years, particularly given the earlier evidence that the value per case
of foreign investment has nearly tripled since 1995, as set out in Appendix Figure 4. Although
it is difficult to obtain timely and reliable aggregate data on mergers and acquisitions, there
is substantial anecdotal evidence confirming the conclusion that increases in M&A activity
over the last twelve months have been even more dramatic than previously. Table 2 documents
a number of high-profile M&A cases involving foreign firms and provides some indication of the
scale and breadth of recent changes.
Figure 10 gives some indication of the sectoral patterns of M&A activity over the last two
years. It indicates that manufacturing is still the largest area of M&A activity by far, in terms
of the number of recorded cases. The importance of M&A in the financial sector has increased
sharply from 1997 through 1998 to 1999 as the process of recapitalisation and reconstruction
of the banking sector continues. Since the size of these deals has often been large, financial
sector activity is probably even more important in value terms than Figure 10 and Appendix
Figure 3 reflect.
Trends in sources and destination of FDI
For many years, the United States has been the major source of FDI inflows into Japan. Since
the early 1990s, the US share has been between 20 and 50%. European investors hold second
place, with between 20 and 40% over the same period. Major European investors have come
from the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Much of the recent
Dutch investment in Japan, particularly since 1990, was made up of funds originating in other
countries and channelled through Netherlands Antilles, rather than capital actually gener-
ated in the Netherlands (OECD 1994). Data for Japanese FDI inflows by region are set out in
Figure 11, Appendix Figures 2, 5 and 6.
The United States has retained its lead, accounting for 60.3% of total FDI in 1998. In the
same period, the Netherlands held a share of  9.5%, the United Kingdom 2.8%, and Switzerland
2.5%. The expansion of investment by foreign-owned companies already operating in Japan
has also accounted for an increasing share of FDI in recent years, representing 12.9% of total
FDI in 1998. In many countries, the reinvested earnings of established foreign firms account
10
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Figure 8 The number of Japanese M&A deals
Figure 9 The form of Japanese M&A deals
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for the majority of recorded FDI flows. The fact that this is not true in Japan is an indication
of the relatively small stock of foreign capital in Japan.
There has been some variation in the sectoral destination of investments from different
countries. In 1998, the majority of FDI inflows of the machinery sector came from the
reinvested earnings of existing firms and did not represent new acquisitions or ventures. The
overwhelming share of FDI in the chemical industries was from European countries. North
America was easily the largest source of FDI into the Japanese financial sector, while
European investors were the largest participants in trading and services industries. In part,
these trends reflect the comparative advantages of particular countries in terms of investment
in particular sectors.
Manufacturing
45%
Commerce
29%
Finance
9%
Other non-
manufacturing
17%
Sectoral Japanese M&A Deals(cases)
(1997)
Source: HSBC, Tokyo.
Manufacturing
44%
Commerce
24%
Finance
15%
Other non-
manufacturing
17%
(1998)
Sectoral Japanese M&A Deals(cases)
Source: HSBC, April 1999, Tokyo.
Figure 10 Sectoral patterns in Japanese M&A deals, 1997 and 1998 (cases)
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The main prefectures in which foreign affiliates in Japan based themselves in 1996 were Tokyo
(701 cases), Osaka (8.3 cases), Kanagawa (81 cases), and Hyogo (23 cases) (Table 3). Tokyo also
dominated other prefectures in terms of measures such as sales, the number of employees and
capital investment, although Chiba and Aichi were significant locations in terms of sales and
Kyoto in terms of capital investment. There is no evidence that this pattern has changed
significantly in the last three years. Prefectures outside metropolitan Japan, however, are
actively promoting inward FDI and, because of lower costs and locational advantages in the
chain of new distribution systems, are areas of interest to new foreign investors.
Much of this distribution reflects relative economic size, although outside Tokyo other
regions also have advantages in terms of lower costs. The Tokyo economy is equal in size to that
of Brazil and larger than that of Canada or South Korea. Kanagawa and Chiba are neighbour-
ing prefectures of Tokyo and benefit from being part of a region of over 31 million high income
and cosmopolitan consumers. Osaka, Hyogo and Kyoto are prefectures within Kansai, the
second largest metropolitan region, which has a population of over 20 million. Costs (labour
and housing) there are lower than in Tokyo and local governments have put in place aggressive
development plans. Aichi is part of the third largest region, also with around 20 million people
and much lower costs of living than the other two regions.
Figure 11 Japanese FDI inflows by region (values)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, May 1999, Tokyo.
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Behind the trends
This section has examined the marked expansion of FDI inflows into Japan over the last three
years. Unlike earlier booms in inward investment, these trends cannot be explained by the
strength of the Japanese economy. Much of the new activity has been directed towards non-
manufacturing sectors, many of which were previously sheltered from foreign competition. The
next section explores the factors that are driving these trends by examining the reasons why
FDI into Japan has traditionally been low and why the situation for foreign investors is now
changing.
Why is the foreign investment climate in Japan improving?
Although direct prohibitions on FDI have been low for some time, many features of the
Japanese system have traditionally made FDI in Japan a costly and risky business. This
Table 3 Foreign affiliates by prefectures (1996)
Prefecture     Number of Companies Sales Number of Capital
Total Manufacturing Non- (JPY million) Employees Investment
manufacturing (JPY million)
Tokyo 994 293 701 16,257,788 186,882 510,447
Osaka 123 40 83 324,174 5,716 5,795
Kanagawa 130 49 81 440,919 9,276 15,365
Hyogo 35 12 23 424,366 8,282 25,838
Chiba 23 8 15 195,738 1,525 1,090
Aichi 22 11 11 172,650 1,710 2,845
Shizuoka 15 12 3 80,092 1,890 2,618
Kyoto 10 9 1 36,666 618 3,610
Saitama 10 6 4 40,591 1,794 1,406
Ibaraki 6 3 3 34,644 973 24,660
Fukuoka 6 3 3 9,973 64 16
Mie 4 4 - 27,130 615 380
Hiroshima 4 4 - 15,117 329 623
Gunma 4 4 - 5,537 299 1,702
Gifu 4 1 3 2,315 68 21
Yamanashi 3 1 2 8,249 355 109
Nagano 3 2 1 4,567 130 105
Shiga 3 2 1 3,671 216 71
Okinawa 3 2 1 2,476 139 141
Source: MITI, The 31st Survey of Trends in Business Activities of Foreign Affiliates in Japan, July 1998,
Tokyo.
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section describes how the traditional pillars of that system – relatively closed capital and
labour markets and a tightly controlled distribution system – are crumbling. In combination
with deregulation and new incentives, this is greatly improving the environment for foreign
investors.
The traditional system
The historically low levels of inward FDI into Japan are the product of a number of different
features of the Japanese economy that have traditionally made profitable foreign investment
in Japan difficult. In some cases, Japanese policy explicitly sought to limit foreign participation
and investment in particular sectors and activities such as media and communications. At the
same time, the heavy burden of regulations, particularly in Japan’s notoriously unproductive
services sector, effectively restricted competition (both foreign and domestic) in many indus-
tries, reducing the attractiveness of investment opportunities in Japan.
These disadvantages have been reinforced by Japan’s high corporate tax rates (until
recently around 50%), which also reduced the profitability of operating in Japan. Between 1990
and 1994, the corporate tax burden as a proportion of operating surpluses was more than twice
as high as the OECD average. The relatively high cost of purchasing Japanese assets and land,
particularly in the late 1980s, also discouraged foreign investors.
Although the constraints of the regulatory and tax frameworks have been important
impediments to FDI, more fundamental obstacles have arisen from the closed nature of capital
and labour markets and of business networks. Successful foreign investment generally
requires the purchase of assets and the recruitment of high quality local staff. Since a large
amount of foreign investment is aimed at establishing a base for the delivery of goods and
services, the ability to tap into local distribution and retail networks is also crucial.
To appreciate recent changes in Japan, it is critical to understand how the particular
difficulties of acquiring assets, recruiting staff and gaining access to distribution systems in
Japan have in the past combined to raise the costs and risks of starting up an operation in
Japan. The stable relationships that arose between workers, employers and firms, largely as
a means of sharing risk, have in practice made the Japanese system relatively hard for
newcomers to access directly.
Under the Japanese keiretsu system, cross-shareholdings between companies are com-
mon. In 1994, financial institutions and corporations owned nearly 70% of all stocks. Banks,
particularly the so-called main banks, have played an important part in this system both as
18
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major shareholders and as principal lenders to related companies. Reliance on the main banks
as a source of low-cost funding meant that Japanese firms rarely saw the need to seek capital
from elsewhere. The concentrated and stable share ownership meant that large portions of
company stock were in practice not heavily traded.
As a result of this system of stable cross-holdings, rather than legal or regulatory
impediments, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity has been weak in Japan by interna-
tional standards, as noted in the previous section. Because of these arrangements, it is as a
practical matter difficult to purchase a significant part of a company’s shares. What this has
meant is that foreign investors in Japan have usually been required to establish ‘greenfields’
operations, often at substantial cost. M&A is the most common vehicle for FDI outside Japan.
The difficulties of acquiring a Japanese presence through this route have tended to raise the
entry hurdle for foreign investors.
Foreign investors have also found it hard to access Japanese labour markets. In
establishing a foreign operation, it is often important to be able to attract high quality local
staff. This is particularly true where it is difficult for foreign firms to acquire local businesses,
and their staff, in an open market. Like Japan’s capital markets, the labour market has also
been relatively closed. Under the old system of lifetime employment, it was usual for employees
to enter long-term relationships with their firms. Employers would contract or tacitly commit
to retain workers even during downturns while workers would provide loyalty and would not
seek to move to other firms.
As a consequence, employment patterns have been very stable by international stand-
ards and labour mobility, particularly inter-firm mobility, is very low. The tradition of
seniority-based pay, which effectively delivers a premium for long service with a single
employer, has also encouraged stability in employment histories while the practice of keeping
workers ‘unemployed on the job’ has artificially reduced the pool of people seeking employment.
Until recently, Japanese employees have been reluctant to leave existing employers and work
for foreign firms. The resulting difficulties for recruitment are reflected in JETRO surveys of
foreign affiliates and investors operating in Japan, with 60% reporting difficulties in securing
human resources.
The peculiar nature of the Japanese retail and distribution system has also made it
difficult for newcomers to access distribution networks. This is partly a result of direct
regulation. The retail sector has been, and still is, a highly regulated part of the economy. In
particular, the 1979 Large Scale Retail Store Law effectively limited the establishment of new
19
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large stores until the early 1990s (see Box 1). The retailing sector has thus been characterised
by a high density of small and relatively low-productivity outlets.
The high cost of land, particularly in urban centres, has also influenced the structure of
the distribution network. Wholesalers, who can locate away from the most expensive areas,
play a much more important part in the retail chain than in many other OECD countries and
it is not uncommon for there to be several ‘layers’ of wholesaler between manufacturers and
retailers. Access to wholesaling operations then becomes crucial to successful distribution and
market penetration.
Vertical integration between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers is common. Even
where formal integration has not occurred, the use of rebates, special deals and staff exchanges
have led to a high degree of de facto integration. For instance, sales staff for department stores
may be supplied by wholesalers and manufacturers and many distributors operate open-ended
return schemes for retailers. These kinds of practices have led to highly stable (and often
exclusive) relationships between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Until recently, it
was relatively rare for retailers to switch suppliers and to move outside the established
network.
These closed networks have created a distribution system that new suppliers or
distributors, particularly those from abroad, have found it hard to break into. Since successful
foreign investment often relies on its ability to provide the means for product distribution and
service delivery, the difficulty of accessing existing networks has been a particular problem for
prospective investors.
The problems of acquiring assets, recruiting staff and accessing distribution networks
have tended to reinforce each other. If, for instance, it had been easy to acquire existing assets,
the problems of recruiting staff or accessing distribution networks could have been overcome
by direct purchase of existing operations. In effect, the existence of a wide range of stable
relationships between employers, employees, firms, banks and suppliers created a closed
system that has been extremely difficult to break into.
Why is the environment for foreign investors changing?
Over the last five years, the impediments to foreign investment have begun to crumble as
traditional relationships are stretched to breaking point by the new and harsher economic
environment. With the old system so obviously in trouble, the government has also been more
willing to act on its deregulation agenda. In December 1994, a new body, the Administrative
20
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Reform Committee, was appointed for a three-year term to oversee regulatory reform. Since
then, the government has released regular action plans for deregulation in a broad range of
areas. Although the political constraints on aggressive reform remain severe, there is little
doubt that the pace of deregulation has picked up, particularly since the strong push by the
Hashimoto government in 1996.
Pressure has come not only from deregulation but also from the new competitive forces
arising from a period of prolonged stagnation and falling prices. The high-growth economy is
dead and firms are scrambling to adapt to a new environment where low growth is usual and
competition is fierce. The ‘hidden’ assets of the high-growth era and the 1980s boom period can
no longer be called in to cover management weakness and mistakes. Errors nowadays are more
likely to lead to bankruptcy or some form of takeover.
Even in areas where the government has been slow to act, seven years of economic
stagnation have created an environment where change is accepted as inevitable. Institutions
across Japan are contemplating radical restructuring of the way they conduct their business.
Box 1  Toys‘R’Us – persistence pays off
The arrival of Toys‘R’Us in Japan five years ago, and the example it has set, has altered traditional commercial
practices in retailing, both in terms of innovation in distribution at the level of manufacturers, wholesalers and
retailers, and in pricing. Major volume specialist sales store networks have expanded greatly as have mail-order
business. The strong purchasing power of such bases has led to more direct transfers between manufacturers
and retailers, and SMEs establishing joint operation companies in order to reduce costs through joint
purchasing. Wholesalers have undertaken new activities such as sales promotions in an attempt to survive. On
the price side, prices are increasingly being set in the market, with the number of retailers following
recommended retail prices falling from 70 per cent to 30 per cent in the 5 years since Toys‘R’Us was established
in Japan. But the Toys‘R’Us story was not one of clear sailing. Perseverance was required early on to overcome
impediments from the Large Scale Retail Store Law which enabled established small retailers to call on MITI
to block the initial investment. A domestic toy manufacturers’ coalition attempted not to sell their toys to the
company. Intervention by US agencies, widespread publicity of events, and persistent pressure from the
company broke down these obstacles. Foreign involvement in the industry continues to grow with internet-
based commerce involving foreign companies such as American Malls forecast to soar from 8.7 trillion yen
in 1998 to 70 trillion yen in 2003.
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In many areas, the push for change has a momentum that is independent of the political
process.
In particular, massive restructuring is taking place not only in the financial sector but
also in the non-financial corporate sector. The old corporate convoy is breaking up as firms find
their way ahead or drop behind in a more open and competitive business environment. The
credit crunch is speeding this process of natural selection. Many small businesses, tradition-
ally heavily supported by government, are finding it hard to survive.
As the high costs of the current economic structure are recognised, the need for further
deregulation is increasingly acknowledged. Prime Minister Hashimoto began his term with an
impressive program for financial market and other reforms. Although his program of fiscal
consolidation and some elements of his financial package ran aground, there was significant
progress with financial reform under his ‘Big Bang’ agenda. More recently, Prime Minister
Obuchi established an Economic Strategy Council in August 1998, which has since recom-
mended a series of long-term reforms that include the strengthening of the deregulation and
anti-monopoly agenda.
Greater opportunities for foreigners are going hand in hand with domestic reform and
tougher times. As weaker companies succumb and stronger ones look for support, foreign firms
are playing a larger role in corporate Japan. There is also a huge re-positioning by embattled
Japanese corporates as they seek partnerships and alliances with foreigners on their own turf.
In particular, the dramatic changes in the Japanese economy are weakening or removing
some of the traditional barriers to foreign investment. The shake-up in Japan’s financial sector
is creating scope for greater foreign involvement and asset purchases. Retail distribution
networks are becoming more fluid, spurred by regulatory changes and increased competitive
pressure. With the breakdown of the lifetime employment system, foreign firms are finding it
easier to recruit. These changes in traditional relationships, examined below, are creating
openings for foreign enterprises that can establish a local presence.
Since the bursting of the asset price bubble at the beginning of the 1990s, Japan’s
financial system has essentially been on life support. The weakness in the banking sector
imposes a drag on the rest of the economy which has seen the government move aggressively
down the path of financial deregulation as part of its ‘Big Bang’ agenda. The sector is going
through a massive shake-up, with consequences for foreign investors that extend well beyond
the financial industry itself.
Traditionally, Japanese financial markets have been highly segmented and heavily
regulated. Until recently many financial activities were restricted to particular kinds of
22
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institutions. The result was a series of relatively sheltered and separate financial markets.
These barriers are now being dismantled, increasing the scope for competition and diversifi-
cation. Direct regulation of prices has gradually been abolished and financial segmentation has
been reduced. As well as broadening the range of activities that financial institutions can
undertake, reforms have also allowed previously prohibited activities. In 1994, forward
agreements on interest rates and exchange rates were allowed for the first time. Securities
firms can now offer options trading, derivatives and loan-backed securities. Under the new
system, individuals can now hold accounts abroad directly, where before they could only access
foreign investment opportunities through a mutual fund.
One area where the impact of reform has been particularly important and where
opportunities are expanding rapidly is the pension fund industry. Until recently, private fund
management was limited to trust banks and life insurance companies. The relatively closed
market usually involved cosy relationships between funds and private companies. Corporate
pension funds were often run not on the basis of return but invested disproportionately in the
firms whose assets they were managing. As part of a series of reforms to pension provision, the
pension fund market was partially opened to domestic and foreign advisory firms in 1996,
leading to an immediate rise in foreign activity.
Reforms of this kind have opened the finance industry itself to greater foreign involve-
ment (see Box 2). Foreign banks and insurers have seized the opportunity to exploit their
comparative advantage in areas where Japanese banks have been weak and to gain access to
the large pool of Japanese household assets, which are still held disproportionately in the form
of bank deposits and cash. Their success is evidenced by a sharp increase in foreign market
share in many financial activities (see Box 3).
But the implications of the ‘Big Bang’ for foreign investment in Japan reach far beyond
the financial sector itself. In the long run, the more important impact is likely to be that the
opportunities to acquire stakes in Japanese companies will increase, as financial reforms open
up the traditionally closed system of capital allocation and firms shift financing away from
banks to the capital markets. Already, the deregulation process has led to a significant shift
in the balance of corporate financing with larger manufacturing companies, in particular,
shifting towards raising capital through securities markets.
The corporate sector’s dependence on bank loans as a source of new fund-raising has
fallen dramatically since the late eighties. Funds raised through bank borrowing were around
40 trillion yen (A$533 billion) in 1990, but have been negative in aggregate (i.e. there have been
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Box 2  Foreign involvement in Japan’s financial sector
The reforms to fund management, and to the financial sector more broadly, have prompted dramatic
restructuring. The result has been a reduction in financial institution cross-holdings, a wave of mergers and
divestments amongst domestic institutions and greater foreign involvement. The market share of foreign
brokers almost doubled to 30% in 1997, with Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch moving to the top of the league
in terms of trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, while foreign life insurers are also gaining market share.
Foreign mutual funds saw an 86% increase in asset value in the last financial year and foreign banks recorded
a 120% gain in pension fund assets under management over the same period.
Mergers and joint ventures are increasingly common. Merrill Lynch took over large parts of failed securities
house Yamaichi to increase its foothold in the Japanese market, Salamon Smith Barney and Nikko have entered
into a joint venture, Societe Generale has formed an alliance with Nomura, and Fuji and Goldman Sachs are
teaming up in the mutual funds business. Joint ventures are also emerging in life insurance. GE Capital has
signed up to take over the new business of Toho Mutual Life and Meiji Life is now allied with Dresdner.
The changes to fund management that allow investment advisers to manage tax-qualified pension plans are also
creating enormous opportunities and foreign firms are again getting a share of the action. Following the reforms
allowing pension funds to be managed by investment advisers in 1997, there was a 42% increase in funds under
management in 1997. With most insurance companies currently offering returns of around 2.5% a year, many
funds are switching to foreign advisers, who now manage 8% of the overall market. Even the Pension Service
Welfare Corporation has boosted the share of new funds allocating to foreign managers from 15% to 52%.
The pressure for further changes has not abated. The government is currently looking to remove the ban on
pension plans whose benefits vary depending on investment returns. Defined contribution plans, like the US
401(k) scheme, are being considered and the government has already instructed ministries to design the
regulations necessary to implement these changes. The introduction and growth of defined contribution
schemes is likely to create further pressure for higher investment returns.
With Japanese financial institutions in a weakened state, and generally inexperienced in many of the areas
where new business opportunities are opening up, there will continue to be considerable scope for increased
foreign involvement. Given the distinctive nature of the Japanese system, many foreign firms have chosen the
path of joint venture.
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net repayments) since 1994. Although in flow terms, borrowing from banks has fallen markedly
over the nineties, the stock of liabilities has fallen more gradually. According to Bank of Japan
data, borrowing represented around 45% of all non-financial sector liabilities in 1997, down
from around 58% in 1989, but still significantly higher than in most other OECD countries.
This decline has been balanced by a shift in liabilities towards securities, whose share of total
liabilities climbed from 15% to 27% over the same period.
Much of this shift reflects the continuation of a trend towards greater disintermediation
that began in the late 1980s. What is less clear from the available aggregate data is whether
the shift away from bank financing has accelerated over the last two years, as the recession has
taken hold and bank reform has commenced in earnest. The available data on private sector
liabilities do not yet indicate a marked acceleration in the decline in importance of bank lending
since the recession began. It is clear, however, from recent Bank of Japan data that Japanese
banks have cut back dramatically on new lending over the last fifteen months and there is no
sign yet that this trend is abating. Because of this, there are good reasons to suspect that the
reliance on bank lending will continue to fall sharply as the credit crunch continues and as
banks and firms seek to disentangle themselves from each other.
There is plenty of anecdotal support for this prediction. Banks, in their weakened state,
are unwilling or unable to continue lending to some firms. In many cases, they are also
Box 3  GE capital – aggressively acquiring a presence
GE Capital is a US financial services giant that developed in 1932 from providing consumer loans for products
made by its parent, General Electric. Although it has had a presence in several Asian countries for some years,
it has only been recently investing heavily in crisis-hit Asia, including Japan. It expects to earn healthy returns
on these investments, by introducing new processes to cut costs and developing new products, like call centres
and automatic loan machines, to drive revenues. The company faced some obstacles to these investments, and
others such as language and lack of experience in the Japanese market remain, but these have not prevented
the realisation of profitable investments. More broadly, the involvement of GE Capital has been a catalyst in
boosting competition, improving services and prices, as well as improving the reputation of the financial
services sector. For example, the large purchase of Japan Leasing for US$7 billion plus, which is larger than
the Renault–Nissan tie-up, is expected to improve the performance of the industry and to accelerate its
consolidation as well. The company’s involvement has also resulted in attracting other foreign investors who
see the company’s interest reflecting market potential and have seen what is achievable.
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divesting their holdings of shares in Japanese companies as part of the process of improving
their own profitability. These developments are weakening traditional relationships between
banks and non-financial corporations, which have been central to the keiretsu system and
indeed there is evidence that cross-shareholding levels are slowly but surely declining.
Faced with the credit crunch, and with Japanese banks in no position to supply new
capital to ailing corporations, local firms are looking elsewhere for capital injections. In this
environment, not only the banks, but the corporate sector more generally, are finding the
prospects of foreign involvement, either through asset purchases or joint venture, more
attractive. The recent tie-up between Renault and Nissan provides a good example of how
financial sector problems are creating broader opportunities for foreign investment. No
Japanese bank was in a position to take on the risk of injecting capital into the company.
The fact that even companies that have been flagships of corporate Japan and lynchpins
of the keiretsu system are looking abroad for funding makes recent developments all the more
remarkable. In that respect, Nissan’s tie-up with Renault and Ford’s takeover of Mazda in the
automobile industry, traditionally one of the jewels in Japan’s corporate crown, signal the
depth of the changes that are taking place, as do takeovers in the semiconductor and rubber
industries (see Box 4).
The high level of bankruptcies and the need for firms in the financial sector to divest
themselves of non-performing loans are also leading to a liquidation of assets on an unprec-
edented scale. This too is providing opportunities to acquire businesses, where in a normal
context the acquisition of a controlling stake would have been difficult. Merrill Lynch’s
acquisition of Yamaichi, for instance, was only possible in the context of the failure of the
securities house. With asset prices low by historic standards and with local buyers short of
funds, there will be potential for attractive purchases in some sectors.
Alongside the breakdown in traditional relationships between firms and their financiers,
the Japanese distribution system is opening up in equally dramatic ways. Once again it is the
twin pressures of an increasingly competitive deflationary environment and progress on
deregulation that are driving change. Relaxation of regulations on the opening of large retail
outlets has sparked the development of out-of-town shopping centres that are setting new
patterns in retailing. Sales by department and chain stores are stagnating. Tokyu closed its
300 year-old premises in Nihonbashi earlier this year. But sales of convenience stores are
growing rapidly in spite of the recession and new theatre entertainment centres are all the
rage.
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Box 4  Ford and Mazda – getting into distribution
Ford has had a long-standing alliance with Mazda since 1969, which was formalised when it took a 25% equity
stake in the Japanese car firm in 1979. This tie-up was taken to a higher level in 1996 when Ford increased
its share in Mazda to a controlling 33.4% stake. In 1997 a jointly-owned distribution network set up by the two
companies, Autorama, became Ford Sales Japan, leading to a much larger direct marketing presence for the
American auto giant than before. Ford now plans to take over part of Mazda’s own dealership network to
expand its control of distribution of its vehicles in Japan.
The key regulatory changes have involved a series of easings of the Large Scale Retail Store
Law between 1990 and 1994, streamlining the procedures for applying to open large stores and
relaxing the limits on approvals and on opening hours. The result has been a sharp and
persistent rise in the number of new large stores over the last four years.
An equally powerful dynamic has come from the various responses to stagnating sales,
weak consumer spending and falling prices. The difficult business climate for retailers has led
to uncharacteristically aggressive attempts to find ways to reduce costs. Discount stores have
expanded their market share substantially at the expense of traditional retailers. They have
been prepared to locate in suburban areas, to contract directly from suppliers without using
the wholesale network, and to exploit competition between suppliers to secure the lowest cost
products. Supermarkets too have increasingly been prepared to make purchases outside the
normal distribution channels and are proving more willing to switch suppliers in response to
lower prices. Supermarkets are a strong growth element in retailing and the provision of
payments services (for telephone and utilities services, for example) importantly because of
their lead in the application of computer technologies.
As a result, the strong vertical relationships that have traditionally made it difficult to
access the Japanese distribution system are breaking down and the system as a whole is
becoming much more fluid. Manufacturers are finding it hard to control or standardise prices
across stores and, under pressure to reduce prices, distribution routes are becoming more
efficient. Sales between wholesalers dropped 42% between 1994 and 1997, as layers of
wholesaler transactions were eliminated.
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As retailers and wholesalers achieve greater independence, the percentage of companies
reporting that they maintain strong ties with suppliers has dropped sharply. The increasing
willingness to move to new suppliers and to operate outside traditional distribution channels
is proving to be an enormous advantage to foreign producers looking for openings in the
Japanese market. Even small producers are finding that a local presence can now provide a
base for supplying directly to supermarkets and other stores, in a way that would have been
close to impossible ten years ago.
With the recession dragging on and companies seeking to restructure more aggressively,
the Japanese labour market traditions of low unemployment, high job security and low
mobility are also coming under threat. The unemployment rate now stands at 4.8%, a post-war
record, and there are no signs that the rise is abating. Some analysts are predicting that the
unemployment rate could reach levels of close to 10% before the period of recession and reform
is over. The rises in joblessness has been particularly severe for the young. The unemployment
rate for the under-24s is now 9.3%, around twice the overall average. The number of last year’s
graduates who have not yet found employment is also at record levels. Figure 12 describes
trends in the labour market between 1985 and 1998.
Deteriorating labour market conditions are bringing a new flexibility to employment
arrangements. The notion of ‘lifetime employment’ is in retreat, job insecurity is rising, even
for those employed by large domestic corporations, and the high ratio of unemployed to
vacancies is increasing competition for jobs. As a result, recruiting and placement agencies are
expanding their operations and Japanese workers, particularly young graduates, are more and
more willing to contemplate careers in foreign firms. The human resource constraints faced by
foreign firms are also being eased by efforts to allow access to professional qualifications. The
Ministry of Finance is reintroducing an exam for foreign-trained accountants in 1999. There
has also been an easing of access for foreign legal consultants and efforts are underway to
increase mutual recognition of qualifications with major trading partners.
The increased openness of the financial sector, the distribution system and the labour
market in Japan represent general improvements in the ability of foreign investors to operate
in the Japanese market. Other aspects of deregulation are also important for access in
individual sectors.
The government’s Deregulation Action Plan announced in 1995 and its subsequent
revisions have aimed to reduce the regulatory burden in a wide range of industries with varying
degrees of progress and success. As well as the changes to the financial and retail sectors
already discussed, there have been changes in public procurement, in transport and in
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telecoms (see Box 5). Some of these changes have explicitly sought to ease restrictions on
foreign access.
For instance, in 1994 the government altered public procurement procedures for
telecommunications products and medical technology in order to expand opportunities for
foreign firms. Foreign direct investment in the cable TV industry was also recently approved
and the ability to offer international telephone services via the internet was liberalised in
August 1997.
Even where deregulation measures do not directly affect foreign access, they may have
important consequences for foreign firms investing in Japan. Many of the most heavily
regulated sectors (transport, telecoms, energy) provide critical inputs for businesses in Japan.
Traditionally, the cost of these inputs has been much higher than in other developed countries
and this has contributed to the high cost of doing business in Japan. Successful deregulation
is the key to bringing these costs down, and lowering the cost of doing business generally. For
instance, calling long-distance in Japan is now over 75% cheaper than it was in 1997.
Alongside these sectoral changes, attempts have been made to strengthen the effective-
ness of competition policy more generally. Enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Act is to be
toughened. The number of cartels exempt from the Act has fallen from 1,079 in 1976 to 12 in
1997. Proposals to streamline the processes for taking action against unfair trading practices
are also under review.
Figure 12  Wages and employment in Japan, 1985–98
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Box 5  Key deregulation measures in Japan
Telecoms
• Simplification of procedures for broadcasting licences.
• Agreement as part of WTO negotiations to allow greater foreign investment. 33% limit on ownership of
many telecommunications firms abolished.
• Liberalisation of international telephone services via the internet.
• Cable TV opened to foreign investment.
• NTT, Japan’s major telecoms carrier, to be split up in the second half of 1999.
Financial sector
• Abolition of remaining interest rate controls. Forward interest rate and exchange agreements permitted
for the first time.
• Changes to pension funds management allowing foreign advisory firms the right to manage funds.
• Relaxation of restrictions on cross-border transactions.
• Ban on financial holding companies scrapped. End to ‘5:3:3:2’ rule specifying the distribution of
pension fund assets by asset type and removal of restrictions limiting advisory firms to managing only
half of fund assets.
• Deregulation of commission on equity transactions. Foreign Exchange and Control Law changed so
that currency dealing is no longer restricted to authorised banks.
Retail
• Changes to Large Scale Retail Store Law (LSRSL) streamlining application procedures for large stores
and relaxing limits on operating hours.
• Easing of provisions for large supermarkets to obtain liquor licences.
• New law to replace the LSRSL to be delivered by June 2000 to set out more transparent criteria for the
approval of stores.
Transport
• New agreement allowing airline codesharing and improving access for greater number of airlines
signed.
• Fare controls to be abolished in most transport sectors, with ceiling prices replacing direct controls.
Energy
• Liberalisation of imports of refined petroleum products. Electric utilities allowed to source power from
outside providers.
• Deregulation of petrol stations begun, with self-service stations now permitted.
• Deregulation bill expected by the end of 1999 but free entry at retail level in electricity has been ruled
out.
• Advisory panel recommended abolition of price controls on petroleum products.
Procurement
• Public procurement for medical technology and telecommunications procedures revised to give greater
access to foreign firms with advanced technology.
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While there are still substantial obstacles to aggressive reform in Japan and some sectors
remain highly regulated, there are signs that the government’s reforms are having some effect.
According to OECD calculations, the relative price of goods and services in Japan relative to
other countries fell twice as fast for deregulated items than for others.
As well as improvements in the regulatory environment in some sectors, the corporate
tax system and direct incentives available to foreign investors have improved in the last five
years. The overall corporate tax rate (combining national and local taxes) has fallen from
around 50% at the beginning of the nineties to 41% from April 1999, making it comparable to
that of other OECD countries.
Tax concessions for foreign investors have also been made more generous. In July 1995,
a series of measures was announced to encourage FDI inflows and a new body, the Japan
Investment Council (JIC), was set up to coordinate policy on FDI. Foreign investors can now
carry forward business losses for up to ten years, rather than the previous seven-year limit, a
move designed to reduce the high initial costs of start-up in Japan, and loan guarantees to
businesses dealing with designated foreign investors have been extended.
Some steps have also been taken to facilitate M&As and prevent restrictive business
practices. Changes in 1990 to the Security Transaction Law mean that prior notification of
M&A is no longer necessary. The end to the ban on holding companies in June 1997 is also likely
to make it easier to buy Japanese companies.
Some foreign firms have been quick to take advantage of the new opportunities for
involvement in Japan. Foreign involvement has been most obvious in the financial sector. But
other sectors are also experiencing sharp increases in foreign participation. WorldCom’s
application to offer long-distance services in Japan has been approved, in April 1999 British
Telecom and AT&T acquired a major stake in the domestic carrier Japan Telecom, and Cable
& Wireless have made a bid for IDC, a Japanese international telecoms carrier (see Box 6).
Beyond the high profile cases, the Nissans and the Renaults, the Yamaichis and the
Merrills, a quieter revolution is also taking place amongst smaller firms. Individual success
stories, particularly in retailing, of foreign businesses which have set up local operations and
established a presence in Japan, and then expanded rapidly, are multiplying.
Remaining obstacles
Despite the progress, impediments to operating in Japan remain, at least in some sectors.
Recent JETRO surveys identify the high costs of doing business, high level of customer
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Box 6  British Telecom and AT&T – trading on expertise and regulatory
change
In April 1999, British Telecom (BT) and AT&T acquired a 30% stake in Japan Telecom, the country’s second-
largest fixed network telecoms operator. British Telecom will also take a stake in Japan Telecom’s mobile
phone consortium which is applying for a licence in Japan next year. The joint investment builds on BT’s own
presence in Japan, first established in 1985. Analysts have argued that success in penetrating the massive
Japanese telecoms market will be helped by joining forces with a Japanese ‘insider’. The two foreign
companies are planning to use their new venture to develop data, mobile and internet businesses, areas where
they have a technological edge and where domestic companies have traditionally been weak. The renewed
interest in acquiring stakes or forming alliances with Japanese telecoms operators has in part been prompted
by the growing liberalisation of the telecommunications sector which is making these kinds of arrangements
easier. Cable & Wireless is currently attempting to win control of another Japanese operator, IDC, a move that
would have been prohibited not long ago.
requirements, and difficulty in securing human resources as key problems (see Box 7).
Although labour market slack is making it easier to recruit, the change on the ground appears
to be gradual. The activities of recruiting and head-hunting firms are still tightly controlled
by government legislation, with limits to the range of professions that may be handled by
employment agencies and restrictions on the working arrangements of employees hired
through this channel. These restrictions have continued to make it difficult to find staff.
Many sectors (agriculture, transport, mining, energy and construction) remain heavily
regulated and even in those like retail and communications where progress has been made,
there is scope for substantial further liberalisation and streamlining of administrative
procedures. Since many of the high-cost, low-productivity sectors provide services that are
used as inputs in other sectors, they tend to raise the cost of doing business in Japan. Although
in 1991 the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was amended to restrict the
need for prior notification of FDI projects to a limited group of industries, case-by-case approval
is still required in a significant list of sectors including agriculture, forestry, petroleum,
mining, utilities, telecoms and air transport.
Nor is it always clear how much regulatory changes will improve the ability to operate
in particular sectors. The replacement of the Large Scale Retail Store Law in 2000 looks like
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Box 7  Reported problems of doing business in Japan
The Japanese External Trade Relations Organisation (JETRO) conducts regular surveys on the operation of foreign
affiliates and subsidiaries in Japan. These surveys have consistently identified a number of problems faced by foreign
companies. In 1997, around 75% of surveyed companies identified the generally high costs of doing business in
Japan as a problem, while over 65% reported that the strict requirements of Japanese consumers presented
difficulties. Despite evidence of increasing fluidity in the labour market, around 60% of firms also agreed that
difficulties in finding qualified staff was an obstacle to doing business (Figure 13). By contrast, inadequate
incentives to invest and difficulty in procuring materials were not generally viewed as serious obstacles.
Figure 13   Problems involved in operations in Japan
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There is patchy evidence from these surveys of improvements in the operating environment in some areas in recent
years. Fewer companies identified market closure or high business costs as problems in 1997 than in 1995 and the
number of firms complaining about regulations and inspections fell sharply from over 50% to not much more than
30%. But in many areas, the surveys still register a high level of difficulty in certain aspects of conducting business
as a foreign firm in Japan, indicating that there is much that can still be done to make FDI in Japan a more attractive
proposition.
In our own conversations with them, the dominant perception among Australian firms operating or advising in Japan
is that progress towards removing remaining impediments continues to be slow and that resistance to foreign
involvement remains strong, particularly in traditional manufacturing sectors. Several firms complained that the kind
of accurate, timely information needed to assess opportunities was often hard to come by. While some of these
perceptions may be based on past experience, they suggest that it may take some time to convince Australian
companies that the prospects for entry into the Japanese market have improved and for increased activity to take off.
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progress, but the sector will still be quite tightly regulated and retailers continue to expect
difficulties under the new law that will take its place. Since that law gives considerable
discretion to local authorities to administer the new arrangements, there is substantial
uncertainty about how it will operate in practice.
More generally, potential investors still complain of a lack of information or familiarity
about opportunities, commercial practices and customer requirements. Partly for this reason,
joint ventures rather than complete acquisitions have been common. Non-transparent and
non-uniform accounting standards continue to make it difficult for purchasing companies to
assess M&A opportunities. The move to consolidated accounting from 1 April 1999 should ease
these problems but Japan’s accounting and disclosure standards still differ from those in other
developed countries in a number of respects.
The political problems of vigorously  implementing further reforms remain serious. The
delay between approval of measures and implementation is often three or four years. But
against the backdrop of the recession, reform does now have some independent momentum. As
the high costs of the current economic structure are recognised, particularly in the financial
system, the need for further deregulation is increasingly acknowledged.
The foreign investment climate has changed dramatically over the last five years. The
combination of restructuring and reform has increased the ability of foreign firms to acquire
assets in Japan, to recruit staff and to access Japanese distribution and wholesaling systems.
With the easing of regulations in several key sectors and the falls in the corporate tax rate,
these changes have substantially improved the prospects for profitable foreign direct invest-
ment in Japan. With land and asset prices still relatively low, there are good reasons for
Australian firms to examine the opportunities available now, despite the generally poor
macroeconomic news.
The trend towards greater fluidity in capital markets, supply networks and in labour
markets is likely to continue over the next five years, as restructuring intensifies. In that sense,
the climate for foreign investors can be expected to improve further, regardless of the Japanese
government’s policy decisions. The fate of further regulatory reform is less certain. On paper,
the prospects look good. The government has asked MITI to review all permitting and licensing
regulations by March 2001 and the 1998 Deregulation Action Plan has charged the Fair Trade
Commission with assessing all areas of the economy where entry is restricted. A new Retail
Law is expected by June 2000. And financial sector deregulation continues, with a high
probability that ‘defined contribution’ pension plans will soon be allowed.
On the other hand, the political process is still to prove that it can consistently deliver
decisive change. It is one thing to set out ambitious plans and quite another to implement them.
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Even when Japan’s leaders have clear ideas and a firm resolve to reform, they face extraordi-
nary obstacles in imposing their will on a fractured party system and deeply entrenched
sectional and bureaucratic interests. With an LDP leadership contest scheduled for September
1999 and the next general election scheduled for October 2000, there is little time for dramatic
action. In this climate, it seems likely the political focus will remain firmly on the short term
and scope for extensive reform may be limited. But there is a glimmer of hope that the new mood
among the public and the more potent threat of electoral retribution is beginning to create an
environment where inaction is dangerous.
What is undeniable is that there has been a permanent shift in the environment facing
foreign investors in Japan and in attitudes towards them. Greater foreign involvement in the
Japanese economy is now treated as inevitable reality and the important role it has to play in
Japan’s restructuring is widely accepted, if not welcomed everywhere.
As the environment changes, new opportunities are surfacing in a number of sectors. The
next section looks at what recent developments could mean for Australian firms and examines
some of the stories of successful foreign businesses in Japan.
Opportunities for Australian investors in Japan
As a result of the changing environment, new opportunities are opening up for foreign investors
in Japan. This section highlights these opportunities and the experience of some companies
that have successfully established a presence in the Japanese market. At a time of rapid
change, Australian companies may want to act now to make themselves aware of the
opportunities and threats to their business arising from current developments in Japan.
A time for reassessment
The last five years have been a time of unprecedented change in the Japanese economy. The
previous section illustrated how Japan’s extended recession, associated deregulation meas-
ures and industry restructuring are changing traditional business relationships in Japan,
creating a trend towards more open labour and capital markets and easier access to distribu-
tion that will continue over the next five years.
Much of the day-to-day coverage of events in Japan has focused on macroeconomic
weaknesses and the problems in the financial sector. It is important that negative perceptions
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of Japan’s macroeconomic climate do not lead investors to overlook the important positive
developments at the microeconomic level. Despite the recession, the foreign investment
climate is improving.
With land and asset prices low (see Figure 14), regulatory change opening previously
closed industries to foreign competition, a more favourable tax environment and a break-up of
traditional business relationships, it is a good time for Australian investors to reassess the
opportunities for investing in Japan. Past views of the opportunities and obstacles of operating
in the Japanese market are less and less relevant in a rapidly changing investment environ-
ment. A reassessment is needed to identify new opportunities in a timely fashion.
Investors from around the world are already reassessing their options in Japan. The
costs to Australian firms of failing to do the same are not simply lost opportunities. In some
cases, new foreign investment from other sources may worsen the competitive environment for
existing Australian suppliers. For instance, if rival firms seize new opportunities to establish
warehousing and distribution operations in Japan, Australian firms may find that competing
suppliers gain a competitive advantage. Some large US companies such as Cargills, one of the
world’s largest and most experienced grain traders, have bought into failing Japanese trading
houses. These houses are the traditional means by which Australian commodity exporters
enter the Japanese market. Foreign ownership could lead to these companies sourcing from
suppliers with whom they have historic ties rather than from Australian exporters. The lack
of a meaningful market presence can also be a threat. The New Zealand food industry, which
competes with the Australian food industry in much of the Japanese market, has an
increasingly substantial presence in the Japanese market in terms of personnel and invest-
ments. With the Japanese distribution system now easier to break into, it is likely that foreign
suppliers will be more willing to invest in their own distribution network in Japan as they do
in many other countries, with implications for competing Australian suppliers.
It is also important to be aware of progress in deregulation. For example, deregulation
is occurring in the Japanese construction sector where costs have been much higher than those
in countries such as the US and Australia. However, if new standards are established that more
closely meet US industry practices, then Australian construction-related businesses could be
disadvantaged.
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Figure 14 Japanese urban land prices and nominal GDP
Identifying opportunities
There is a great variety in the opportunities that are arising. Successful investors have
spanned a number of sectors. Some have used acquisitions as the route for investment, others
have gone down the path of joint venture or greenfield operations.
Different investors have had different motivations. In some cases, firms have sought to
exploit their technological edge or superior expertise (see Box 8), while in others they have
sought to enhance market presence to aid distribution. The new opportunities in some
instances opened up as a result of bankruptcies, in others through local firms seeking alliances
or capital injections and in others they were the product of regulatory changes that allowed
foreign firms to operate for the first time.
Opportunities are not confined to large firms. Although most of the high-profile cases of
foreign involvement in Japan have involved large transactions, smallness is no disadvantage
in many new sectors such as services (see Box 9). Moreover, such investments offer a rapid
means for small companies to grow and small-scale investments often evolve. Firms that start
by setting up an office overseas to be closer to customers and to know their requirements, may
move on to a joint venture or to an even more substantial investment.
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Because of the wide range of experiences it is not possible to take a cookie-cutter approach
to investing in Japan. The nature of foreign investment will vary according to the project. In
some areas, where local knowledge of the markets, culture and practices is particularly
important, joint venture will be attractive. In others, outright acquisition may be preferable.
For some sectors, the geography of investment will be important. For instance, opportunities
in food processing or distribution may be best located outside of Tokyo or other major economic
centres where the costs of land are cheaper but the advantages of being close to these large
consumer markets still apply.
Although it would be useful to get a sense of the areas in which Australian firms are likely
to have particular advantages, in practice it is difficult to do so in a meaningful way. Current
exporters need not necessarily make future investors. For example, if raw material suppliers
invested upstream, they could end up competing with many of their current customers. On the
other hand, they could invest in more neutral upstream areas, such as warehousing and
distribution, and gain more control over the promotion and delivery of their products.
Given the difficulties of establishing general rules, the best approach is for individual
firms to make themselves aware of the changing environment in their sector. The most useful
forms of assistance will involve helping them in this task.
What can be said is that many of the areas, such as distribution, processed foods, finance,
telecommunications and computer software applications, that are changing most rapidly and
where new foreign investment is increasing most dramatically are areas where there are
highly successful Australian performers. In these sectors, where openings are greater than
elsewhere and where other foreign players are acting, it is particularly important that
Australian firms reassess the current opportunities for them in Japan and the competitive
threats from rival firms who are prepared to invest in the Japanese market.
The recent changes in the foreign investment climate appear to have been starkest in
non-manufacturing industries, particularly in the financial sector, retail and services. In
general, these are sectors where Australian companies are relatively efficient and used to
operating in a relatively lightly regulated, consumer-orientated environment. In many of these
areas, local Japanese firms have had a history of weak productivity, sheltered markets and low
innovation. In some sectors, like the pension fund industry and some parts of the telecoms
market, Japanese operators have had little experience of providing newly permitted services
at all. In these markets, Australian firms may find that they have much to offer in terms of
expertise, new technologies and approaches.
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Box 8  The fast-food revolution – flexible investment through franchising
In the late 1960s, the designation of food services as an industry that could be fully liberalised stimulated a large
inflow of foreign capital into the sector mainly from the US. This capital brought with it innovative
management and the American concept of the franchised, self-service, fast-food restaurant. At the time, most
restaurants in Japan were small operations, often family-run and of highly variable quality. The arrival of US
operators prompted a modernisation of the traditional Japanese food service industry. Success did not involve
a duplication of the American system and indeed firms which just adopted American features wholesale, such
as large drive-in systems, without appreciation of Japanese tastes often failed. The industry today is not
dominated by foreign affiliates, although franchising of foreign chains is now very common. Foreign
participation was a catalyst for change in the domestic industry. This industry development is continuing to
this day through the entry of relatively new operators such as Starbucks coffee shops. Links with new players
in food retailing are important to success in exporting food to Japan, especially processed foodstuffs.
Box 9  Harvey World Travel – A small start is possible
Harvey World Travel, one of Australia’s largest travel service companies but small in the world scene, has
started to look at investing in Japan. Its initial venture was in the management of Aurum Hotels and Resorts
jointly with a Japanese company, HIS Travel, the second largest travel retailer in Japan. This venture will allow
the company to offer more attractive travel packages with the price and availability of the accommodation
component more within their control. No shares were exchanged in this venture although financial equity was
discussed and future arrangements are expected to evolve into an expanded relationship and a broader range
of services such as joint flights. In this way, initially small investment relationships can often evolve as the
parties become more familiar with the circumstances and more confident in their degree of involvement.
As investors from Europe and the US increase their involvement in the Japanese economy,
Australian firms that operate in the sectors in which other foreign firms are now having
increasing success should at the very least be asking the question ‘Why not us?’.
New approaches
For investment opportunities to be realised, suppliers of FDI need to be aware of the available
opportunities, to be able to assess their potential to exploit them and to have the relevant
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information and assistance to be able to carry out a successful investment strategy. In many
cases, lack of information can be a problem, both in terms of overseas companies assessing local
opportunities and in terms of market information including key competitors and the regulatory
environment.
Lack of suitable information, or an easy route to acquire it, can substantially raise the
cost and risks of a new investment. Some companies have set up a small local presence as a
means of getting around this kind of problem. Many trading companies, such as Bonlac, invest
in an overseas office so they can be closer to all their customers and be aware of their
requirements.
Other channels of information, including industry associations and embassy links, have
an important role to play in helping firms to get a handle on the latest developments in Japan.
As part of a strategy aimed at improving their ability to assess and undertake investment
opportunities in Japan, Australian firms will need to make renewed efforts to make themselves
aware of recent regulatory changes in their sectors, to identify remaining impediments and to
find out about the direct incentives available to foreign investors in their area of business. They
may then consider the possibility of establishing some form of market presence on the ground.
Government bodies will have an important role to play in addressing general and
particular obstacles through bilateral negotiation, maintaining awareness of bilateral nego-
tiations with other countries to ensure that Australian interests are not compromised and
encouraging further negotiations on FDI in multilateral forums. The establishment of further
support networks with government involvement, such as the Australian Wine Bureau, is
another route.
The recession and the changes it has induced in the Japanese economy means there is
a new environment for investment into Japan. Some of the historic difficulties of investing in
Japan no longer apply or are substantially weaker than before.
Potential investors need to think beyond traditional perceptions and consider the
opportunities this new environment offers to avoid being left behind. The current circum-
stances offer a window of opportunity but companies will need to spend time and effort to
understand and establish themselves in the Japanese market before undertaking substantial
investments there. Firms will need to consider these opportunities now if they are to position
themselves ahead of others. With lower asset prices and a rapid expansion of openings in some
sectors, this is a good time for firms to apprise themselves of recent developments and to
reconsider the potential for foreign direct investment in Japan.
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Appendix: Figure 3 Sectoral Japanese FDI inflows by value and number of cases
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Appendix: Figure 4 Sectoral inward FDI, by value per case
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Appendix: Figure 5 Japanese inward FDI by region of origin and number of
cases
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Appendix: Figure 6 Japanese inward FDI by region of origin and value per case
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